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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
WALLACE DUNNIVAN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, Utah
State Prison,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.

12841

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal brought by the defendant-appellant,
John W. Turner, Warden, Utah State Prison, from an
order granting the relief requested in a writ of habeas
corpus.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The plaintiff-respondent, Wallace Dunnivan, Petitioned the Third Judicial District Court, Honorable
Joseph G. Jeppson, presiding, for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to Rule 65B (i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The writ was granted and plaintiff-respondent was released from his imprisonment in the Utah State Prison.

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment and order
of the district court that the plaintiff-respondent was in·
carcerated in violation of his constitutional rights and
should be released.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 5, 1970, Wallace Dunnivan, respondent
herein, was found guilty by a jury of assault with a deadly
weapon. The transcript of these proceedings was admitted
into evidence at the habeas corpus hearing held on February 3, 1972 and marked as P-2 (R. 82, T. 30).
In the trial that took place on November 5, 1970, the
following occurred: Peggy Dunnivan, former wife of respondent and victim of the assault took the stand (P-2,
p. 11) and testified that on October 3, 1970, Mr. Dunnivan
came to her home, looked for money in her purse and on
not finding any told her he hated her, "never wanted to
kill anybody more," and demanded $100 or he would kill
her (P-2, p. 13). Her testimony recounted the following
facts: she left and contacted her father, George P. Davis,
who came and drove her to a police station where they.
contacted two police officers, Gerald Hazel and Paul
Hales (P-2, p. 14). The four of them then drove in two I
cars back to her home. Peggy Dunnivan, her father, and
the two police officers entered the house through the
kitchen and confronted the respondent who pulled a gun
on her (P-2, p. 15). The gun was loaded and his finger
was on the trigger (P-2, p. 18). On cross-examination,
1
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1
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she testified that though they had marital relations the
night before (P-2, p. 18) and he "stayed at the house
occasionally," they had not lived together as man and wife
for the preceding 16 months (P-2, p. 19). She testified
he was mad at having cars repossessed and they had argued about it (P-2, p. 21). She denied his having asked
her if she had paid any bills, and said he asked her for
money to go drink with a girl friend (P-2, p. 23). She
denied that he had ever given her much, if any, money
to pay bills (P-2, p. 24). Mrs. Dunnivan also testified
that the weapon used, a sawed-off shotgun, was brought
into the house by respondent and denied that George
Kinsey and Deloris Kinsey Gordon had brought the gun
to the house, or had given the gun to her. She testified
that Mr. Dunnivan had only worked sporadically since
his initial release from prison on a prior conviction, that
he only gave her a few dollru'S occasionally to pay her back
for money borrowed from her and that the car that was
repossessed was hers and the truck that was repossessed
was in her name (P-2, p. 45-46). She said his name was
not on the note for the truck (P-2, p. 47-48).
George P. Davis, Mrs. Dunnivan's father, then took
the stand and testified as to the events with which he was
involved, including driving his daughter to the house and
having respondent raise the gun as he answered yes to
having threatened Mrs. Dunnivan (P-2, p. 51ff).
Merlene Dunnivan, twelve year old daughter of
Peggy Dunnivan, testified that she heard Mr. Dunnivan
threaten to kill her mother if she did not get $100 to be
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used to go out with a girl, and then observed him take
the barrel of the gun from a cupboard and load it (P-2,
p. 60-72).
Officer Gerald M. Hazel of the Spanish Fork Police
Department testified that he entered the house, heard
respondent admit he had threatened to kill Mrs. Dunnivan and claim he would do it. Officer Hazel then saw
respondent raise the shotgun above the table where his
arm was then pinned (P-2, p. 72-78).
Officer Paul Hales of the Spanish Fork Police De·
partment testified to the same effect that respondent ad·
mitted threatening Mrs. Dunnivan and claimed he would
kill her as he raised the gun.
The State then rested and the defense consisted of!
the testimony of respondent who denied any intent to
fire the gun at Peggy Dunnivan and contradicted the tes· ,
timony of Peggy Dunnivan by testifying that he gave
her money on several occasions (P-2, p. 95-96, 121), never;
saw the gun before (P-2, p. 103).
The State rebutted this by further testimony of
Peggy Dunnivan (P-2, p. 126).
That same day the jury returned with a verdict of
guilty (P-2, p. 137). This conviction was appealed on '
the grounds of :insufficiency of evidence and conviction
was affirmed on appeal by this Court in State v. Dunni·
van, 26 Utah 2d 147, 486 P. 2d 393 (1971).
Thereafter, on July 16, 1971, respondent petitioned
the Fourth Judicial District Court for a writ of error
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coram nobis. As grounds for said motion, respondent
alleged that Peggy Dunnivan lied in that: (2) she did
receive money from Wallace Dunnivan; (b) she received
the gun from George Kinsey, in the presence of Deloris
Keener and Ray Hallam and it was in fact hers; (c) they
did live as man and wife; (d) their poor relationship was
not his fault. This petition was denied on July 21, 1971
(R. 93-96). No appeal was taken from this denial.
On August 23, 1971, respondent petitioned the Third
Judicial District Court for a writ of habeas corpus alleging his conviction denied due process because of insufficient evidence and known use of perjured testimony by
the prosecution (R. 1, 2). Over objection by the state
the District Court allowed the petition to be amended
to allege denial of due process through the prosecutor's
knowing or unknowing use of perjured testimony (R. 2,
54-55) . The allegation of a knowing use of perjured testimony was later eliminated by counsel for Mr. Dunnivan
and the Court aclmowledged that there was no evidence
that the prosecutor Jr.new of any of the alleged perjury
by Mrs. Dunnivan (R. 85-86).
The evidence at the hearing on the writ of habeas
corpus consisted of Deloris Keener and George Kinsey
who testified that in July prior to the assault that they
saw Peggy Dunnivan take from the dump and place in
her car what appeared to be a broken sawed-off shotgun.
They also saw Mr. Dunnivan give her money (R. 55-74).
By stipulation it was established that a third witness, Ray
Hallam, would also testify that he was at the dump and

6

saw Peggy Dunnivan place an old sawed-off shotgun in I
her car (R. 29-29a). Respondent, Wallace Dunnivan, t.es.'
tified that he in fact had cosigned the note for the truck.
On February 18, 1972, Judge Joseph G. Jeppson,
Third Judicial District Court, granted the writ of habeas
corpus because Mr. Dunnivan was "convicted on per· .
jured testimony." He was ordered "released without de-!I
lay." The respondent in the habeas corpus action appeals
the judgment and order.
1

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PERJURY ALONE VITIATED
THE CONVICTION BECAUSE PERJURED
TESTIMONY DOES NOT RESULT IN A
VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS UNLESS IT
WAS USED KNOWINGLY BY THE PROSECUTION.
A knowing use of perjured testimony by the prosecution to obtain a conviction violates due process and
vitiatees the conviction. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264,
79 S. Ct. 1173, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217 (1959); Alcorta v. Texas,
355 U. S. 28, 78 S. Ct. 103, 2 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1957).

But both (1) perjury and (2) a knowing use thereof
by the prosecution must be established to justify collat- ·
eral attack on the conviction. This Court decided this
issue in the case of Gallegos v. Turner, 17 Utah 2d 273,
1
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409 P. 2d 386 (1965). In that case a writ of habeas corpus
was brought on the ground that the key witness perjured
himself with knowledge of the district attorney. The denial of the writ was affirmed because the evidence showed
only inconsistencies, not perjury, and no evidence of
knowledge of the prosecutor. This Court said:
"The mere fact of inconsistency does not constitute proof that the testimony he gave at the
trial was false. Much less does it support the
charge that the prosecutor knew of perjured testimony but nevertheless wilfully and intentionally
used it, which is what would have to be shown in
order to justify collateral attack upon the conviction." Id., 17 Utah 2d at 276.
This statement of the law is consistent with the vast
majority of cases in holding that, without the element of
knowledge on the part of the prosecutor, collateral attack
on a conviction on the allegation of perjured testimony is
not justified. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, for
example, has consistently held this to be the law. In the
case of Cobb v. Hunter, 167 F. 2d 888 (10th Cir. 1948),
a federal prisoner convicted of robbing a federally insured
bank brought a habeas corpus action alleging the knowing use of perjured testimony. The Court affirmed the
denial of his writ, saying:
"In this habeas corpus proceedings [sic] the
petitioner is put to the burden of not only proving
that Taylor's testimony was false, but that it was
knowingly and intelligently used by the prosecuting authorities in bringing about the conviction.
[Citations omitted.] There is no evidence whatso-
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ever tending to show that the prosecuting authorities in this case knowingly used false testimony
to bring about the conviction, and we should be
content to affirm the judgment of the trial court
on this ground alone." Id. at 889.
In Story v. Burford, 178 F. 2d 911 (10th Cir. 1949), cert.
den., 338 U. S. 951, 70 S. Ct. 482, 94 L. Ed. 587 (1949),
an Oklahoma state prisoner convicted of murdering his
wife brought a federal habeas corpus alleging perjured
testimony. His writ was denied:

"The vice which vitiates the judgment of a
court is the knowing, wilful and intentional use
of perjured testimony to secure a conviction. [Citations omitted.] Petitioner expressly testified
that he did not have any evidence showing that
the County Attorney or the presiding judge knew •
that the witnesses were perjuring themselves." Id. '
at 911.

Wild v. State of Oklahoma, 187 F. 2d 409 (10th Cir. 1951), .
held that a conviction of manslaughter was not vitiated
merely by false testimony:

"This court has consistently followed the rule '
that a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted
upon the grounds that false and perjured testi·
mony was used unless it is shown that it was know·.
ingly used against the defendant by the prosecut·
ing officers in the criminal case [citations omitted] ." Id. at 410.

Similarly, a more recent case from the Federal District .
Court in the Southern District, New York, Dansby v.
United States, 291 F. Supp. 790 (S. D. N. Y. 1968), held ,
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that a motion to set aside or in the alternative a new trial
was properly denied. The court held:
"A petitioner seeking to vacate a judgment
of conviction allegedly based on perjured testimony has the burden of establishing that the testimony was perjured, that it was material to his
conviction and that the government either participated in the perjury or had knowledge of it. Petitioner's claim is defective on all three grounds."
Id. at 793.
Appellant is aware of only one case which appears
to hold somewhat differently on this issue. This is Jones
v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 97 F. 2d 335 (6th Cir.
1938), involving a man convicted of murdering his wife
and sentenced to death. His appointed counsel had only
three days to prepare for trial and a continuance was denied. Principal witnesses were a six year old girl and a
"woman of ill repute." Newly discovered evidence "cast
grave doubt upon the competency and freedom from
duress of one upon the veracity of both." Id. at 336. The
prosecution did not know of this new evidence and in
fact, when it was made known, the Attorney General of
Kentcky actually acknowledged that the conviction should
not stand and encouraged the state and federal courts to
grant the relief requested in the writ of habeas corpus.
The Governor of the State felt bound by a pledge not to
exercise the pardoning power. The state courts and lower
federal court nevertheless did not grant the writ, but the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals granted the writ, refusing
to be bound by rigid formalism to the exclusion of justice.
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Jones, supra, was cited in dictum in Imbler v. Craven,
298 F. Supp. 795 (C. D. Cal. 1969), suggesting that a neg.
ligent use as well as a knowing use of perjured testimony
might deny due process, but the facts of that case established a knowing use and the court acknowledged that the
rule in the Ninth Circuit was still contrary to Jones, requiring "knowledge" on the part of the prosecutor. Id. at
805.

The holding in the Jones case, supra, was urged upon
the Court of Appeals of the D. C. Circuit in the case of
Hodge v. Huff, 140 F. 2d 686 (C. A. D. C. 1944). That
case involved a man, convicted of incest, who brought a
writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his daughter had per·
jured herself and that he had new evidence. The Court
emphasized that collateral attack is only permissible when
the conviction is void, not merely erroneous, and that
perjury does not deprive a case of validity unless it is so
intertwined with the rest of the case as to deprive one of
due process. There was no evidence of misconduct of the
prosecutor and not enough evidence of perjury to warrant
a new trial, much less relief in habeas corpus. Jones,
supra, was rejected as an aberration, "a hard case which
sometimes produces bad law." Id. at 688.
The suggestion that the rule requiring knowledge of
the prosecutor is too strict has been answered by Ronald
Boyce in his note in the Utah Law Review, Suppressed
Evidence, 5 Utah Law Review 92 (1956):
"This seeming harshness may be justified
since the courts have distinguished violations of

i
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due process from the discretionary opening of a
case for new evidence or new trial, being much
more lenient in the latter case." Id. at 96.
This Court emphasized this same consideration in Ward
v. Turner, 12 Utah 2d 310, 366 P. 2d 72 {1961). It is a
much greater burden on the petitioner to justify relief in
habeas corpus than to obtain a new trial.
"In order to justify a release of a convicted
person under a writ of habeas corpus or coram
nobis, or other special writ, the evidence of his
innocence must be stronger than would be necessary in the first instance in support of a motion
for a new trial, for such special writs are applied
for after the defendants' conviction has been
affirmed or denied on appeal, and in a sense they
invade the usual rules for the finality of judgments." Id. at 313-314.
Even a motion for a new trial will not be granted
unless it is shown that newly discovered evidence (1)
could not, with reasonable diligence, have been produced
at trial, (2) is not merely cumulative, and (3) is such
that there would probably be a different result on retrial.
State v. Jiron, 27 Utah 2d 21, 492 P. 2d 983 (1972); Butt
v. Graham, 6 Utah 2d 133, 307 P. 2d 892 (1957); State v.
Hawkins, 81 Utah 16, 16 P. 2d 713 (1932); and State v.
Stewart, 57 Utah 224, 193 Pac. 855 (1920).
In summary, therefore, the foregoing indicates that
a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted on the basis
of perjured testimony unless it can also be established
that it was used knowingly by the prosecuting authorities. There is a much greater burden on a petitioner in
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habeas corpus to establish a denial of due process because
of the use of perjured testimony than if he were to request a new trial. And even a new trial should not be
granted unless the evidence couldn't have been produced
at trial, is not merely cumulative, and is such that a dif.
ferent result will probably result on a retrial.
The facts of this case are totally inappropriate to
justify release on habeas corpus. It is clearly established
that the prosecutor lmew nothing of any alleged perjury.
This alone is sufficient to require a denial of the writ.
And even the alleged perjury is not involved with the
material elements of the crime. The victim of the assault,
her father, and two police officers all testified that the
respondent raised a loaded sawed-off shotgun at his wife,
indicating at the same time an intent to kill or do great
bodily harm to her. A fifth witness who was not present
at the actual assault, respondent's daughter, testified that
he had threatened to kill her mother shortly before the
occurrence. The only allegation of perjury does not go to
any of these above elements but only goes to impeach i
some of the background statements of only one of these
witnesses. Respondent tried to establish that (1) the ,
origin and ownership of the gun was different from what :
Peggy Dunnivan said it was, (2) she had in fact received
considerable money from him when she said she hadn't,
and (3) his name also appeared, along with hers, on the
note for a repossessed truck. All of these alleged facts
were known about at the time of the trial and Peggy
Dunnivan was confronted with these facts on cross-exam·
1
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ination. These allegations of perjury would not even be
sufficient to justify a new trial, much less relief in habeas
corpus.
It was clearly error to grant the relief prayed for in
habeas corpus on these facts.

POINT IL
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PERJURED TESTIMONY DEPRIVED THE RESPONDENT OF DUE PROCESS BECAUSE THE PETITIONER HAD
FULL KNOWLEDGE OF ANY ALLEGED
PERJURY AND WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO
CORRECT BY FAILING TO CORRECT THE
ERROR AT TRIAL.
Even assuming for the sake of argument, without in
any way conceding, that a meritorious allegation of the
knowing use of perjured testimony had been brought, the
petitioner below should still be considered to have waived
this claim. When a defendant fails to object or attempt
to introduce evidence in his own behalf when he knows
that false testimony is being given at his trial, then he
is considered to have waived this issue. In Taylor v.
United States, 229 F. 2d 826 (8th Cir. 1956), cert. den.,
351 U. S. 986, 76 S. Ct. 1055, 100 L. Ed. 1500 (1956), the
defendant was convicted of unlawfully selling narcotics.
His motion to set aside and vacate the sentence was denied and he appealed. He alleged the knowing use of perjured testimony. Among several statements made by the
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government's witness, that were alleged untrue, ,was his
statement that he was not a user of narcotics, when in
fact the government agents knew that the witness did use
narcotics. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the denial of his motion on the basis that he had waived
this right:

"
[T]his motion 'conclusively' shows that
appellant had full information in advance that this
now claimed perjured evidence 'would be given at
the trial', that he could have brought out this situation during the trial, procuring the action of the
trial judge and jury as to matters now urged; and
possibly, could have urged such in his motion for
a new trial. He did none of these. This statutory
remedy [ § 2255, Title 28 U. S. C. - Complement
to Federal Habeas Corpus] and procedure cannot
be used as a substitute for a motion for a new trial :
nor for an appeal. Hence, 'the motion and the files '
and records of the case conclusively show that the
prisoner is entitled to no relief.' § 2255. To allow
an accused person, with actual advance knowledge
that perjured evidence was knowingly to be used ·
by the prosecution, to remain silent as to that
situation during the entire trial and after his con·
viction to attempt to set the judgment aside by
collateral attack would seriously interfere with the
proper orderly administration of criminal law. The
accused is fully entitled to present, at his trial, all
evidence in defense of which he has actual knowl·
edge at that time. He cannot remain silent as t;o
such thus hoping to gain an acquittal on the evi·
dence actually presented and therefor except t.o
have a second trial and chance for acquittal on
evidence he has knowingly concealed at the time
of trial. He must be deemed to have waived his
1
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rights because of such inaction. Even constitutional rights may be waived." Id. at 833-834.
In the case of Green v. United States, 158 F. Supp.
804 (D. C. Mass. 1958) a defendant urged in a motion
to vacate his sentence that he heard his attorney and the
prosecutor discuss the fact that the prosecution was going
to use perjured testimony. His motion was rejected because he had waived his right to object.
"If Raccaforte [witness] did commit perjury,
and if Mr. Hassan [prosecutor] knew that Raccaforte was committing perjury, Green knew both
these facts at the trial. On these matters he has
no new information of substance that he did not
possess on the morning before he was set to the
bar for trial. Where at his trial a defendant has
knowledge that the prosecutor is knowingly using
perjured testimony, and the defendant does not
then raise the point, ordinarily he cannot later
have an adverse judgment set aside on the basis
of that prior knowledge. Taylor v. United States,
8 Cir., 229 F. 2d 826, 833-834; Price v. Johnston,
334 OS 266, 291, 68 S. Ct. 1049, 92 L. Ed. 1356. A
defendants' failure to assert at the trial a known
defense is usually an abandonment or waiver of
that defense [citations omitted]." Id. at 809.

See also McQuinn v. United States, 99 App. D. C. 286, 239
F. 2d 449 (1956), cert. den., 353 U. S. 946, 77 S. Ct. 818,
1 L. Ed. 2d 942 (1956).
Wallace Dunnivan knew at the time of the trial all
of the facts raised in his hearing on habeas corpus. The
transcript of the original trial indicates that respondent's
attorney cross-examined Peggy Dunnivan as to giving
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her certain amounts of money on certain days (P-2, p.
24) . He also cross-examined her as to whether or not the
weapon used was hers, found at the dump in company
with George Kinsey and Deloris Kinsey Gordon (P-2, p,
27) . He also cross-examined her as to the signature on
the note for the truck (P-2, p. 47-38). Respondent had
all the opportunity the law allows to raise these defenses
to any statement by Peggy Dunnivan he may have con·
sidered untrue. Any further evidence in support of his
claim should have been raised at that time and his failure
to do so is clearly a waiver of that right and a bar to a
subsequent use of this evidence on habeas corpus.
POINT III.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE RELEASE OF THE RESPONDENT WITHOUT DELAY.
Rule 65B (i) (8), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that in a habeas corpus proceeding:
"If the court finds in favor of the complainant,
it shall enter an appropriate order with respect to
the judgment or sentence in the former proceed·
ings and such further orders with respect to re·
arraignment, retrial, custody, bail or discharge as
the court may deem just and proper in the case."
This Court has stated that the proper remedy is not
outright release of a prisoner but remedial orders to rem·
edy any deficiency. In the case of Chapman v. Graham,
2 Utah 2d 156, 270 P. 2d 821 (1954), the Third Judicial
District Court released a petitioner forthwith, finding
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that it was cruel and unusual punishment to incarcerate
him before he was allowed to have surgery on a weak
and almost useless right arm. On appeal this Court held
that there was no cruel and unusual punishment and further stated it was improper to release the petitioner.
"In passing, we are constrained to suggest
that in this case the trial court more properly
could have made the petitioner's discharge conditional upon affirrnance by us or upon failure of
appeal within the prescribed time, or knowing that
the prisoner would depart the state posthaste upon
his release admitted him to bail in order to assure
his return to proper custody should this court
happen to disagree, as we have, with the trial
court." Id. at 159.
A similar rule is stated in the Tenth Circuit case of
Gill v. Turner, 443 F. 2d 1064 (10th Cir. 1971). There
the District Court of Utah had found a plea of guilty involuntary and had released the petitioner immediately.
The Court of Appeals felt constrained to uphold the trial
court's factual determination that the plea was involuntary, but criticized the outright release of the petitioner.
"Though this court is bound by the trial
court's finding that Gill's plea was involuntary, it
does not follow that the trial court was correct in
its order and judgment which discharged Gill literally out of the courthouse door and onto the street,
instanter. The trial court's determination that
Gill's plea of guilty was involuntary because of
physical abuse and threats was not, of course, an
adjudication of his guilt or innocence, nor did it
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constitute a bar to further proceedings in the state
court upon the original robbery charge. Wynn v.
Page, 390 F. 2d 545 (10th Cir.)."
,
!

In the present case the petitioner was "released without delay." This was improper because the habeas corpus:
hearing did not determine the guilt or innocence of Mr.
Dunnivan but was meant only to determine the truth or
falsity of some minor statements at the original trial by
only one of several state witnesses. The granting of the
writ without proof of a knowing use of perjured testimony
by the prosecution was improper, but even in a meritorious habeas corpus action the "just and proper" remedy
would seem to almost never be an outright release of the
petitioner. Therefore, the District Court was in error in
ordering the release of Mr. Dunnivan.
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CONCLUSION
Respondent did not allege or show any knowing use !
of perjured testimony by the prosecution. Furthermore
he waived any right to object to any knowing use of per·
jured testimony by knowing at the time of trial all of the
facts brought out in the collateral attack. The District
Court erred in granting the writ of habeas corpus on this
state of facts. Further, the District Court erred in order·
ing the release of the respondent without delay.
I

:!I

,I

The appellant therefore requests that the decision of
the District Court in granting the writ of habeas corpus
and releasing the respondent be reversed.

